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Abstract
We consider mechanisms that provide traders the opportunity to exchange
commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij. Given any con-
nected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique mechanism
MG that satisfies some natural conditions of “fairness”and “convenience”.
Let M(m) denote the class of mechanisms MG obtained by varying G on
the commodity set {1, . . . ,m}. We define the complexity of a mechanism
M inM(m) to be a pair of integers τ(M), π(M) which represent the “time”
required to exchange i for j and the “information”needed to determine the
exchange ratio (each in the worst case scenario, across all i 6= j). This induces
a quasiorder  onM(m) by the rule
M M ′ if τ(M) ≤ τ(M ′) and π(M) ≤ π(M ′).
We show that, form > 3, there are precisely three-minimal mechanisms
MG in M(m), where G corresponds to the star, cycle and complete graphs.
The star mechanism has a distinguished commodity —the money —that serves
as the sole medium of exchange and mediates trade between decentralized
markets for the other commodities.
∗In honor of Lloyd Shapley.
†Stony Brook Center for Game Theory, Dept. of Economics; and Cowles Foundation
for Research in Economics, Yale University
‡Department of Mathematics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
§Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University; and Santa Fe Institute,
New Mexico.
1
Our main result is that, for any weights λ, µ > 0, the star mechanism is
the unique minimizer of λτ(M) + µπ(M) onM(m) for large enough m.
JEL Classification: C70, C72, C79, D44, D63, D82.
Keywords: exchange mechanism, minimal complexity, prices, money.
1 Introduction
We start with a Cournotian model of an exchange mechanism M on com-
modity set {1, . . . ,m} , in which the actions available to traders are of a
very simple kind1. For certain ordered pairs ij, pre-specified by M , each
trader may offer any quantity of commodity i in order to obtain commodity
j. Once every offer is in, the mechanism M redistributes to the traders all
the commodities it has received, holding back nothing. The returns to the
traders are calculated by an algorithm2 that is common knowledge. Thus
a mechanism M is characterized by a collection of exchange opportunities,
which form directed graph G on {1, . . . ,m}, and the algorithm. We assume
throughout that G is connected, i.e., M permits iterative exchange of any i
for any j.
At this level of generality, there are infinitely many mechanisms for any
given graph G. However, we shall show that only one of them satisfies some
natural conditions of “fairness”and “convenience”(see section 3). This spe-
cial mechanism is denoted MG and is described precisely in section 2. It is
a striking property of MG that it admits unique prices3, which depend only
on the aggregate offers by the traders on the various edges of G, and which
mediate trade in the following strong sense: first, the return to any trader
1It is our purpose to see how far matters may develop within such an elementary
Cournot mechanism. In particular, note that ex ante there are no “prices” to refer to,
upon which a trader may condition his offers. We do show that prices can be “admitted”,
i.e., defined, but this happens ex post once unconditional offers for trade have come into
the mechanism. Our mechanisms are thus a far cry from the more complex Bertrand
mechanisms, in which traders use prices alongside quantities in order to make contingent
statements to protect themselves against vagaries of the market (see,e.g., [4], [22]). An
analysis analogous to ours might well be possible in the Bertrand setting, but that is a
topic for future exploration.
2There is no presumption that the algorithm be “informationally decentralized”. In-
deed even the return to a simple offer of i, made only via the pair ij, may well depend on
all the offers at every kl ∈ G; and may thus require a lot of information for its computation.
3Prices are rays in Rm++, i.e., invariant under multiplication by positive constants, and
represent consistent exchange rates between commodities.
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depends only on his own offers and the prices; second, the total value –
under the prevailing prices – of every trader’s offers is equal to that of his
returns. The immediate upshot of price mediation is that the returns to any
trader can be calculated in a transparent manner from the price ratios pi/pj
and his own offers.
Thus we are led to consider the classM(m) of mechanisms MG, where G
ranges over all directed, connected graphs on the vertex set {1, . . . ,m}. The
cardinality ofM(m), though finite, grows super-exponentially in m. However
we shall show in section 2 that if one invokes natural complexity considera-
tions, based on the time needed to exchange any commodity i for j and the
information needed to determine the exchange ratio pi/pj, then the welter
of mechanisms inM(m) is eliminated and we are left with only three mech-
anisms of minimal complexity, namely those that arise from the star, cycle
and complete graphs (Theorem 1). Indeed, provided m is large enough, just
the star mechanism remains (Theorem 2) in which one commodity emerges
endogenously as money and mediates trade across decentralized markets for
the other commodities4.
2 The Emergence of Money
Let G be a directed and connected graph5 with vertex set {1, . . . ,m}. We
define a mechanism MG as follows. Each trader can use every opportunity
inM, i.e., place arbitrary weights on the edges ij of G, representing his offer
of i for j. Let bij denote the total weight on ij (i.e., the aggregate amount
of commodity i offered for j by all traders). We shall specify what happens
when bij > 0 for every edge ij in G, i.e., when there is suffi cient diversity in
4To be precise: the price of any commodity 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 , in terms of money m,
depends only on the aggregate offers on edges im and mi; and thus this pair of edges may
be viewed as a decentralized market for i and m, with m mediating between the various
markets.
5In this paper by a graph we mean a directed simple graph. Such a graph G consists of
a finite vertex set VG, togther with an edge set EG ⊆ VG × VG that does not contain any
loops, i.e., edges of the form ii. For simplicity we shall often write i ∈ G, ij ∈ G in place
of i ∈ VG, ij ∈ EG but there should be no confusion. By a path ii1i2 . . . ikj from i to j we
mean a nonempty sequence of edges in G of the form ii1, i1i2, . . . , ik−1ik, ikj.If k = 0 then
the path consists of the single edge ij, otherwise we insist that the intermediate vertices
i1, . . . , ik be distinct from each other and from the endpoints i, j. However we do allow
i = j, in which case the path is called a cycle. We say that G is connected if for any two
vertices i 6= j there is a path from i to j.
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the population of traders so that each opportunity is active. Denote b = (bij)
and let Rm++/ ∼ be the set of rays in Rm++ representing prices. It is well-known
that (with bij understood to be 0 if ij is not an edge in G) there is a unique





pjbji for all j. (1)
Note that the left side of (1) is the total value of all the commodities
“chasing”j, while the right side is the total value of commodity j on offer;
thus (1) is tantamount to “value conservation”.




bT where bH =
∏
ij∈H
bij for any subgraph H (2)
and Ti is the collection of all trees in G that are rooted at i (i.e., subgraphs
of G in which there is a unique directed path from each j 6= i to i).
The principle of value conservation, which determines prices, also de-
termines trade. An individual who offers aij units of i via opportunity ij
gets back rj units of j, where piaij = pjrj. More generally, if a trader offers
a = (aij) ≥ 0 across all edges of G, he gets a return r(a, b) ∈ Rm+ whose





for all j. Thus the return to a trader depends only on his offer a and the
price ratios pi/pj, which are well-defined functions of b (unlike the price vector
p = (pi) which is only defined up to a scalar multiple). It might be instructive
to see the formulae for price ratios (and thereby also for returns, thanks to
equation (3)) for specific mechanisms. Let us, from now on, identify two
mechanisms if one can be obtained from the other by relabeling commodities.
There are three mechanisms of special interest to us called the star, cycle,
and complete mechanisms; with the following edge-sets and price ratios:
G Star Cycle Complete
EG {mi, im : i < m} {12, 23, . . . ,m1} {ij : i 6= j}
pi/pj bmibjm/bimbmj bj,j+1/bi,i+1 ∗
For the star and cycle mechanisms, the right-hand side of (2) involves a
single tree and, in the ratio pi/pj, several factors cancel leading to the simple
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expressions in the table above. However, for the complete mechanism there
is no cancellation and in fact here each price ratio depends on every bij.
The class of G-mechanisms is the set
M(m) = {MG : G is a directed, connected graph on {1, . . . ,m}} . (4)
Although finite, M(m) is rather large, indeed super-exponential in m. We
shall see that some natural complexity considerations help cut down its size.
Consider a trader who interfaces with M ∈ M(m) in order to exchange
i for j. A natural concern for him would be: what is the minimum number
of time periods τij (M) needed to accomplish this exchange? We define the
time-complexity of M to be
τ (M) = max
i 6=j
τij (M) . (5)
It is evident that τij (M) is the length of the shortest path in G from i to j
and τ (M) is the diameter of the graph G.
The other concern of our trader would be: how much of commodity j can
he get per unit of i? It follows from equation (3) that he can calculate this
from the state b of the mechanism which determines the price ratio6 pi/pj.
Thus the question can be rephrased: how many components of b does he
need to know7 in order to calculate pi/pj? The table above indicates that it
is easier to compute pi/pj for the star and cycle mechanisms than, say, the
complete mechanism.
To make this notion precise, if f is a function of several variables x =
(x1, . . . , xl), let us say that the component i of x is influential if there are
two inputs x, x′, differing only in the i-th place, such that f (x) 6= f (x′).
Define πij(M) to be the number of influential components of b in the price
ratio function pi/pj. For example, from the expression for pi/pj for the star
mechanism in the previous table, it is clear that πij(M) is 4 unless one of i




6If there is a continuum of traders (see Section 7), his own action has no affect on the
price ratio. Otherwise it affects the aggregate offer and thereby the price ratio, which is
but to be expected in an oligopolistic framework. In either case, equation (3) applies; and
pi/pj is the exchange ratio between i and j.
7And, since he always knows his own offer, this is the same as asking: how many
components does he need to know of the aggregate offer of the others ?
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We now define a quasiorder  (reflexive and transitive) on M(m) by
M M ′ ⇐⇒ τ(M) ≤ τ ′(M ′) and π(M) ≤ π′ (M ′) (7)
We are ready to state our main result8.
Theorem 1 If9 m > 3 then the three special mechanisms are precisely the
-minimal10 elements of M(m). Their complexities are as follows:
Star Cycle Complete
π(M) 4 2 m(m− 1)
τ(M) 2 m− 1 1
This has the following immediate consequence.
Theorem 2 Given any choice of strictly positive weights λ, µ > 0, there
exists an integer m0 such that for m ≥ m0 the star mechanism is the unique
minimizer in M(m) of λπ(M) + µτ(M).
Theorem 2 says that, so long as traders ascribe positive weight to both
time and price complexity considerations, the star mechanism with money
is the unique optimal mechanism as soon as the number of commodities is
suffi ciently large.
Remark 3 In fact m0 does not have to be too large. We only require 4λ +
2µ < 2λ + (m − 1)µ and 4λ + 2µ < m(m − 1)λ + µ for the star to beat the






+ 3 and m2 −m > µ
λ
+ 4
So, for example, if at least 10% weight is accorded to both π and µ, then
λ/µ and µ/λ can each be at most 9 and the above inequalities will hold if
m > 18 + 3 and m2 −m > 9 + 4; thus m0 = 22 does the job.
8A word about the numbering system used in this paper: all theorems, remarks, con-
ditions, lemmas etc. are arranged in a single grand sequence. Thus the reader shall see,
in order of appearance: Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Remark 3, Condition 4,. . . . This does not
mean that Condition 4 is the fourth condition; in fact it is the first condition, but it has
fourth place in the grand sequence (and, the marker 4 makes the remark easy to locate).
9When m = 3, we get a fourth mechanism with complexities 4, 2 identical to the star
mechanism. And when m = 2, we must change 4 to 2 in the table (the three graphs
become identical with complexities 2, 2 for each).
10M is said to be-minimal inM(m) if there is noM ′ ∈M(m) for which τ(M ′) ≤ τ(M)
and π(M ′) ≤ π(M), with strict inequality in at least one place.
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3 Characterization of G-mechanisms
Our analysis above was carried out on the domain M(m). We now show
how to derive M(m) from a more general standpoint. To this end, let us
first define an abstract exchange mechanism on commodity set {1, . . . ,m}
and with trading opportunities given by a directed, connected graph G on
{1, . . . ,m}. Such a mechanism allows individuals in {1, . . . , n} to trade by
means of quantity offers in each commodity i across all edges ij in G. (Here
m is fixed and n can be arbitrary.) The offer of any trader can thus be viewed
as an m×m non-negative matrix in the space
S = {a : aij = 0 if ij /∈ G, aij ≥ 0 otherwise}
Define
S+ = {a ∈ S : aij > 0 if ij ∈ G}
Also define
a = (a1, . . . , am)
where ai =
∑
j aij is the i-th row sum of a and denotes the total amount
of commodity i involved in sending offer ai. Let Sn be the n-fold Cartesian
product of S with itself, and (with a = (a1, . . . ,an)) let
S(n) =
{





denote the n-tuples of offers that are positive on aggregate. Also let C = Rm+
denote the commodity space; and Cn its n-fold product.
An exchange mechanism M , for a given set {1, . . . ,m} of commodities
and with trading opportunities in accordance with the graphG, is a collection
of maps (one for each positive integer n) from S(n) to Cn such that, if a ∈







i.e., there is conservation of commodities. It is furthermore understood, in
keeping with our concept of opportunity ij, that for an offer a ∈ S whose only
non-zero components are {aij : j = . . .}, the return will consist exclusively of
commodity j.
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We shall impose four conditions on the mechanisms which reflect “con-
venience”and “fairness”in trade. The first condition is that the mechanism
must be blind to all other characteristics of a trader except for his offer (and
rules out discrimination on irrelevant grounds):
Condition 4 (Anonymity) Suppose a ∈ S(n) and aα = aβ. Let r denote
the returns that accrue from a.Then rα = rβ.
The second condition is that if any trader pretends to be two different
persons by splitting his offer, the returns to the others is unaffected. In
its absence, traders would be faced with the complicated task of tracking
everyone’s offers. It is easier (and suffi cient!) to state this condition for the
“last”trader.
Condition 5 (Aggregation) Suppose a ∈ S(n) and b ∈ S(n+ 1) are such
that aα = bα for α < n and an = bn + bn+1 . Let r,s denote the returns that
accrue from a,b respectively. Then rα = sα for α < n.
Anonymity and Aggregation immediately imply that, regardless of the
size n of the population, the return to any trader may be written r(a, b),where
a ∈ S is his own offer and b ∈ S+ is the aggregate of all offers. Thus
ν(a, b) = r(a, b)− a denotes his net trade.
The third condition is Invariance. Its main content is that themaps which
comprise M are invariant under a change of units in which commodities are
measured. This makes the mechanism much simpler to operate in: one does
not need to keep track of seven pounds or seven kilograms or seven tons, just
the numeral 7 will do.
In what follows, we will consistently use a for an individual’s offer and b
for the positive aggregate offer; so, when we refer to the pair a, b it will be
implicit that a ∈ S, b ∈ S+ and a ≤ b.
Condition 6 (Invariance) ν(λa, λb) = λν(a, b) for all a, b and any m×m
strictly positive diagonal matrix λ.
The fourth, and last, condition is that no trader can get strictly less than
his offer (otherwise, such unfortunate traders would tend to abandon the
mechanism).
Condition 7 (Non-dissipation) If ν(a, b) 6= 0, then νi(a, b) > 0 for some
component i.
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It turns out that these four conditions categorically determine a unique
mechanism.
Theorem 8 LetM be an exchange mechanism on commodity set {1, . . . ,m}
and let G be the (directed, connected) graph induced by the trading opportu-
nities in M. If M satisfies Anonymity, Aggregation, Invariance and Non-
dissipation, then M = MG.
3.0.1 Comments on the Conditions
Aggregation does not imply that if two individuals were to merge, they would
be unable to enhance their “oligopolistic power”. For despite the Aggrega-
tion condition, the merged individuals are free to coordinate their actions
by jointly picking a point in the Cartesian product of their action spaces.
Indeed all the mechanisms we obtain display this “oligopolistic effect”, even
though they also satisfy Aggregation.
It is worthy of note that the cuneiform tablets of ancient Sumeria, which
are some of the earliest examples of written language and arithmetic, are in
large part devoted to records and receipts pertaining to economic transac-
tions. Invariance postulates the "numericity" property of the maps r(a, b)
(equivalently, ν(a, b)) making them independent of the underlying choice of
units, and this goes to the very heart of the quantitative measurement of
commodities. In its absence, one would need to figure out how the maps are
altered when units change, as they are prone to do, especially in a dynamic
economy. This would make the mechanism cumbersome to use.
Non-dissipation (in conjunction with Aggregation, Anonymity, and the
conservation of commodities) immediately implies no-arbitrage: for any a, b
neither ν(a, b)  0 nor ν(a, b)   0. To check this, we need consider only the
case a ≤ b and rule out ν(a, b)  0. Denote c = b−a. Then ν(a, b)+ν(c, b) =
ν(a + c, b) = ν(b, b) = 0, where the first equality follows from Aggregation,
and the last from conservation of commodities. But then ν(a, b)  0 implies
ν(c, b)   0, contradicting Non-dissipation.
3.0.2 Alternative Characterizations of G-Mechanisms
The formula (3) for the return function of a G-mechanism immediately im-
plies
p(b) = p(c) =⇒ r(a, b) = r(a, c) for all a ≥ 0 and b, c > 0 (8)
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In [8], a mechanism was supposed to produce both trades and prices, based
upon everyone’s offers; and the property (8) was referred to as Price Media-
tion. It was shown in [8] that M(m) is characterized by Anonymity, Aggre-
gation, Invariance, Price Mediation and Accessibility ( the last representing
a weak form of continuity). An alternative characterization of M(m), which
assumes —as we do here —that a mechanism produces only trades (and no
prices), was given in [9]. Here we have presented a simplified version of the
analysis in [9], and established that MG arises “naturally”once we assume
that trading opportunities are restricted to pairwise exchange of commodi-
ties, i.e., correspond to the edges of a connected graph G. In contrast, in both
[8] and [9], the opportunity structure G was itself an object of deduction,
starting from a more abstract viewpoint.
3.1 Related Literature
The need for money in an exchange mechanism has been a topic of much
discussion. We give a brief synopsis. (For a much fuller survey, see [35] and
[36].)
Several search-theoretic models, involving random bilateral meetings be-
tween long-lived agents, have been developed following Jevons [17] (see, e.g.,
[2], [16], [18], [19], [20], [21], [23], [38] and the references therein). These
models turn on utility-maximizing behavior and beliefs of the agents in Nash
equilibrium, and shed light on which commodities are likely to get adopted as
money. A parallel, equally distinctive, strand of literature builds on partial
or general equilibrium models with other kinds of frictions in trade, such as
limited trading opportunities in each period, or transaction costs (see, e.g.,
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [24], [25], [36], [37], [39]). In many of these models, a
specific trading mechanism is exogenously fixed, and the focus is on activity
within the mechanism that is induced by equilibrium, based again on the
optimal behavior of utilitarian individuals.
Our approach complements this literature in two salient ways, and brings
to light a new rationale for money that is different from those proposed ear-
lier, but not inimical to them, in that the door is left fully open to incorporate
their concerns within our framework. First, as we have emphasized, our focus
is purely on mechanisms of trade with no regard to the characteristics of the
individuals such as their endowments, production technologies, preferences
or beliefs. Second, no specific trading mechanism is specified ex-ante by us.
We start with a welter of mechanisms and cut them down by our four condi-
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tions and by complexity considerations, ultimately ending up with the star
mechanism.
The model we present builds squarely upon [8], which provided an ax-
iomatic characterization of the finite set of "G-mechanisms" (see section 2),
bridging the gap between the Shapley-Shubik model of decentralized “trading
posts”, i.e., the star mechanism (see [31], [32], [33]) and the Shapley model
of centralized “windows”, i.e., the complete mechanism (see [30]). Various
strategic market games, based upon trading posts, have been analyzed, with
commodity or fiat money in [5], [26], [27], [28], [31], [32], [33], [34]; most of
these papers also discuss the convergence of Nash equilibria (NE) to Wal-
ras equilibria (WE) under replication of traders. For a continuum-of-traders
version, with details on explicit properties of the commodity money (its dis-
tribution and desirability) or of fiat money (its availability and the harshness
of default penalties), under which we obtain equivalence (or near-equivalence)
of NE andWE, see [7], [10]; and, for an axiomatic approach to the equivalence
phenomenon, see [6].
Strategic market games differ in a fundamental sense from the Walras
equilibrium model, despite the equivalence of NE and WE. In the WE frame-
work, agents always optimize generating supply and demand, but markets
do not clear except at equilibrium. We are left in the dark as to what
happens outside of equilibrium. In sharp contrast markets always clear, pro-
ducing prices and trades based on agents’strategies, in the market games;
but agents do not optimize except at equilibrium. The very formulation of a
game demands that the “game form”, i.e., the map from strategies to out-
comes, must be defined prior to the introduction of agents’preferences on
outcomes; thus disentangling the physics of trade from its psychology. Our
mechanisms are firmly in this genre, and indeed form the bases upon which
many market games are built. To be precise: game forms arise from our
mechanisms by introducing private endowments, along with the constraints
that these impose on individuals’offers; and strategic market games then
arise by further introducing preferences.
11
4 Proofs
4.1 Graphs with complexity ≤ 4
Let G be a connected graph on {1, . . . ,m} as in section 2, and write
pi (G) = pi (MG) , pij (G) = pij (MG) and π (G) = π (MG)
If G consists of a single vertex then π (G) = 0 by definition.
Lemma 9 If G is a cycle then π (G) = 2.
Proof. Each vertex i in a cycle has a unique outgoing edge, and we denote





as in (2); hence pi/pj = aj/ai and the result follows.
By a chorded cycle we mean a graph that is a union G = C ∪P where C
is a cycle and P , the chord, is a path that connects two distinct vertices of
C, but which is otherwise disjoint from C.
Lemma 10 If G = C ∪ P is a chorded cycle then π (G) = 4.
Proof. Let i be the initial vertex of the path P , then i has two outgoing
edges, ij and ik say, on the cycle and path respectively. Any vertex l 6= i
has a unique outgoing edge, and we denote its weight by al as before. Let
x be the terminal vertex of the path P . If x = j then G has two j-trees,
otherwise there is a unique j-tree; similarly if x = k then there are two
k-trees, otherwise there is a unique k-tree. Thus we get the following table:































In every case, the ratio pj/pk depends on all 4 variables aj, ak, bij, bik, thus
π (G) ≥ 4.
On the other hand, since all vertices other than i have a unique outgoing
edge, it follows that if x is any vertex then every x-tree contains all the
outgoing edges except perhaps the edges bij, bik and ax (if x 6= i); thus px
is divisible by all other weights. It follows that for any two vertices x, y
the ratio px/py can only depend on the variables bij, bik, ax, ay. Thus we get
π (G) ≤ 4 and hence π (G) = 4 as desired.
11This is a departure from our convention heretofore that a shall refer to an individual’s
offer, and b to the aggregate offer; but there should be no confusion.
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Remark 11 A special case of a chorded cycle is a graph T0 with three vertices






p3 b23 (b12 + b13)
p1/p2 b23/b12
p2/p3 b12b31/b23 (b12 + b13)
p3/p1 (b12 + b13) /b31
For future use we note that for each index j there is an i such that πij ≥ 3.
By a k-rose we mean a graph that is a union C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck, where the
Ci are cycles that share a single vertex j, but which are otherwise disjoint.
Thus a 0-rose is a single vertex and a 1-rose is a cycle. If G is a k-rose for
some k ≥ 2 then we will simply say that G is a rose.
If each cycle in a rose G has exactly two vertices, i.e., is a bidirected edge,
then we say that G is a star.
Lemma 12 If G is a rose then π (G) = 4.
Proof. Let G be the union of cycles C1 ∪ · · · ∪Ck with common vertex j
as above. Let a1, . . . , ak be the weights of the outgoing edges from j in cycles
C1, . . . , Ck respectively, and for all other vertices x let bx denote the weight
of the unique outgoing edge at x. It is easy to see that there for each vertex v







if x 6= j is a vertex of Ci
Thus we get
pj/px = bx/ai, py/px = bxal/byai if y 6= j is a vertex of Cl
Taking i 6= l, we see that py/px depends on 4 variables, and π (G) = 4.
Our main result is a classification of connected graphs with π (G) ≤ 4.
Theorem 13 If G is not a chorded cycle or a k-rose, then π (G) ≥ 5.
We give a brief sketch of the proof of this theorem, which will be carried
out in the rest of this section. The actual proof is organized somewhat
differently, but the main ideas are as follows.
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We say that a graph H is a minor of G, if H can be obtained from G by
removing some edges and vertices, and collapsing certain kinds of edges. Our
first key result is that the property π (G) ≤ 4 is a hereditary property, in the
sense that connected minors of such graphs also satisfy the property. The
usual procedure for studying a hereditary property is to identify the forbidden
minors, namely a set Γ of graphs such that G fails to have the property iff
it contains one of the graphs from Γ. We identify a finite collection of such
graphs. The final step is to show that if G is not a chorded cycle or a k-rose
then it contains one of the forbidden minors.
We note the following immediate consequence of the results of this section.
Corollary 14 If G is not a cycle then πij (G) ≥ 4 for some ij.
4.2 Subgraphs
Throughout this section G denotes a connected graph. We say that a graph
H is a subgraph of G if H is obtained from G by deleting some edges and
vertices.
Proposition 15 If G′ is a connected subgraph of G then π (G) ≥ π (G′).
Proof. For a vertex i in G′ let p′i and pi denote its price in G
′ and G
respectively; we first relate p′i to a certain specialization of pi.
Let E,E ′ be the edge sets of G,G′ respectively, and let E0 (resp. E1)
denote the edges in E \ E ′ whose source vertex is inside (resp. outside) G′.
Let p̄i be the specialization of pi obtained by setting the edge weights in E0
and E1 to 0 and 1 respectively. Then we claim that
p′i = |F | p̄i, (9)
where F is the set of directed forests φ in G such that
1. the root vertices of φ are contained in G′,
2. the non-root vertices of φ consist of all G-vertices not in G′.
Indeed, consider the expression of pi as a sum of i-trees in G. The spe-
cialization p̄i assigns zero weight to all trees with an edge from E0. The
remaining i-trees in G are precisely of the from τ ∪ φ where τ is an i-tree
14
in G′ and φ ∈ F , and these get assigned weight wt (τ). Formula (9) is an
immediate consequence.






Thus the ij price ratio in G′ is obtained by a specialization of the ratio
in G. Consequently the former cannot involve more variables. Taking the
maximum over all i, j we get π (G) ≥ π (G′) as desired.
4.3 Collapsible edges
We write out(k) for the number of outgoing edges at the vertex k. In a
connected graph we have out(k) ≥ 1 for all vertices, and we will say k is
ordinary if out(k) = 1 and special if out(k) > 1. Among special vertices, we
will say that k is binary if out(k) = 2 and tertiary if out(k) = 3.
Definition 16 We say that an edge ij of a graph G is collapsible if
1. i is an ordinary vertex
2. ji is not an edge of G
3. there is no vertex k such that ki and kj are both edges of G.
Definition 17 If G has no collapsible edges we will say G is rigid.
If G is a connected graph with a collapsible edge ij, we define the ij-
collapse of G to be the graph G′ obtained by deleting the vertex i and the
edge ij, and replacing any edges of the form li with edges lj. The assumptions
on ij imply that the procedure does not introduce any loops or double edges,
hence G′ is also simple (and connected). Moreover each vertex k 6= i has the
same outdegree in G′ as in G.
Lemma 18 If G′ is the ij-collapse of G as above, then π (G) ≥ π (G′) .
Proof. Let k be any vertex of G′ then k is also a vertex of G. Since i
is ordinary every k-tree in G must contain the edge ij; collapsing this edge
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gives a k-tree in G′ and moreover every k-tree in G′ arises uniquely in this
manner. Thus we have a factorization
pk (G) = aijpk (G
′) .
Thus for any two vertices k, l of G′ we get pk (G) /pl (G) = pk (G′) /pl (G′)
and the result follows.
We will say thatH is a minor ofG if it is obtained fromG by a sequence of
steps of the following kind: a) passing to a connected subgraph, b) collapsing
some collapsible edges. By Proposition 15 and Lemma 18 we get
Corollary 19 If H is a minor of G then π (H) ≤ π (G) .
4.4 Augmentation
Throughout this section G denotes a connected graph.
Notation 20 We write H E G if H is a connected subgraph of G, and write
H C G to mean H E G and H 6= G.
We say that H C G can be augmented if there is a path P in G whose
endpoints are in H, but which is otherwise completely disjoint from H. We
refer to P as an augmenting path of H, and to K = H ∪P as an augmented
graph of H; note that K is also connected, i.e. K E G. It turns out that
augmentation is always possible.
Lemma 21 If H C G then H can be augmented.
Proof. If G and H have the same vertex set then any edge in G \ H
comprises an augmenting path. Otherwise consider triples (k, P1, P2) where
k is a vertex not in H, P1 is a path from some vertex in H to k, and P2
is a path from k to some vertex in H. Among all such triples choose one
with e (P1) + e (P2) as small as possible. Then P1 and P2 cannot share any
intermediate vertices with H or with each other, else we could construct a
smaller triple. It follows that P = P1 ∪ P2 is an augmenting path.
We are particularly interested in augmenting paths for H that consist of
one or two edges; we refer to these as short augmentations of H.
Corollary 22 If H C G then G has a minor that is a short augmentation
of H.
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Proof. LetK = H∪P be an augmentation of H. If P has more than two
edges, then we may collapse the first edge of P in K. The resulting graph is
a minor of G, which is again an augmentation of H. The result follows by
iteration.
Lemma 23 If K = H ∪P with P = {jk, kl}, then for any vertex i of H we
have πik (K) = πij (H) + 2.
Proof. The edges (j, k) and (k, l) are the unique incoming and outgoing
edges at k. It follows that every i-tree in K is obtained by adding the edge
kl to an i-tree in H, and every k-tree in K is obtained by adding the edge
jk to a j-tree in H. Thus if ajk and akl are the respective weights of the two
edges in the path P then we have








Thus the price ratio in question depends on two additional variables, and the
result follows.
Corollary 24 If G contains the chorded triangle T0 as a proper subgraph
then π (G) ≥ 5.
Proof. By Corollary 22, G has a minor K = T0 ∪ P , which is a short
augmentation of T0, and it is enough to show that π (K) ≥ 5. If P consists of
two edges {jk, kl} then by Remark 11 we can choose i such that πij (T0) = 3;
now by Lemma 23, we have cik (K) = 5 and hence π (K) ≥ 5. If P consists





b31 (b21 + b23)
b23b12 + b23b13 + b21b13
4.5 The circuit rank
As usual G denotes a simple connected graph, and we will write e (G) and
v (G) for the numbers of edges and vertices of G.
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Definition 25 The circuit rank of G is defined to be
c (G) = e (G)− v (G) + 1
The circuit rank is also known as the cyclomatic number, and it counts
the number of independent cycles in G, see e.g. [3].
Example 26 If G is a k-rose then c (G) = k, and if G is a chorded cycle
then c (G) = 2.
We now prove a crucial property of c (G).
Proposition 27 If H C G then there is some K E G such that H C K and
c (K) = c (H) + 1.
Proof. Let K = H ∪ P be an augmentation of H. If P consists of
m edges, then K has e (H) + m edges and v (H) + m − 1 vertices; hence
c (K) = c (H) + 1.
Corollary 28 Let G be a connected graph.
1. If H C G then c (H) < c (G).
2. c (G) = 0 iff G is a single vertex.
3. c (G) = 1 iff G is a cycle.
4. c (G) = 2 iff G is a chorded cycle or a 2-rose.
Proof. The first part follows from Proposition 27, the other parts are
completely straightforward.
Lemma 29 If G is not a rose and c (G) > 3, then there is some K C G
such that K is not a rose and c (K) = 3.
Proof. Let R be a k-rose in G with c (R) = k as large as possible, then
R C G by assumption. If c (R) ≤ 2 then any K C G with c (K) = 3 is not a
rose. Thus we may assume that c (R) > 2, and in particular R has a unique
special vertex i and at least three loops. Since R 6= G, R can be augmented,
and S = R ∪ P is an augmentation, then P cannot both begin and end at i,
else R ∪ P would be a rose, contradicting the maximality of R. Since there
are at most two endpoints of P, we can choose two distinct loops L1 and L2
of R, such that L1∪L2 contains these endpoints of P . Then K = L1∪L2∪P
is the desired graph.
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4.6 Covered vertices
Definition 30 Let i be an ordinary vertex of G with outgoing edge ij. We
say that a vertex k covers i, if one of the following holds:
1. the edges ki and kj belong to G
2. j = k and the edge ki belongs to G
If there is no such k then we say that i is an uncovered vertex.
We emphasize that the terminology covered/uncovered is only applicable
to ordinary vertices in a graph G. The main point of this definition is the
following simple observation.
Remark 31 An ordinary vertex is uncovered iff its outgoing edge is collapsi-
ble.
Lemma 32 Suppose G is a connected graph .
1. If v (G) ≥ 3 then an ordinary vertex cannot cover another vertex.
2. If v (G) ≥ 4 then a binary vertex can cover at most one vertex.
3. A tertiary vertex can cover at most three vertices.
4. If G is a rigid graph with c (G) = 3, then v (G) ≤ 4.
Proof. If k is an ordinary vertex covering i then G must contain the
edges ki and ik. Thus i and k do not have any other outgoing edges, and if
G has a third vertex j then there is no path from k or i to j, which contradicts
the connectedness of G, thereby proving the first statement.
If k is a binary vertex covering the ordinary vertices i and j then G must
contain the edges ki, kj, ij, ji. The vertices i, j, k cannot have any other
outgoing edges, so a fourth vertex would contradict the connectedness of G
as before. This proves the second statement.
If a vertex k covers i then there must be an edge from k to i. Thus if
out(k) = 3 then k can cover at most three vertices.
If c (G) = 3 then G has either 2 binary vertices or 1 tertiary vertex, with
the remaining vertices being ordinary. If v (G) > 4 then by previous two
paragraphs G would have an uncovered vertex, which is a contradiction.
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4.7 Proof of Theorem 13
Proposition 33 If c (G) ≥ 3 and G is not a rose, then π (G) ≥ 5.
Proof. By Proposition 15 and Lemma 29 we may assume that c (G) = 3.
By Lemma 18, we may further assume that G is rigid, and thus by Lemma
32 that v (G) ≤ 4. We now divide the argument into three cases.
First suppose that G contains a 3-cycle C. We claim that at least one of
the edges of C must be a bidirected edge in G, so that G properly contains
a chorded triangle T0, whence π (G) ≥ 5 by Corollary 24. Indeed if G has no
other vertices outside C, then G must have 5 edges and 3 vertices and the
claim is obvious. Thus we may suppose that there is an outside vertex l. We
further claim that C contains two vertices i, j such that i covers j. Granted
this, it is immediate that G contains either the bidirected edge ij and ji, or
the bidirected edge jk and kj where k is the third vertex of C. To prove the
“further”claim we note that the special vertices of G consist of either a) one
tertiary vertex, or b) two binary vertices. In case a) the connectedness of G
implies that the tertiary vertex must be in C, and hence it must cover both
the ordinary vertices in C. In case b) either C contains both binary vertices,
one of which must cover the unique ordinary vertex of C; or C contains one
binary vertex, which must cover one of the two ordinary vertices of C.
Next suppose that G does not contain a 3-cycle, but does contain a 4-
cycle labeled 1234, say. Now G has two additional edges, which cannot be
the diagonals 13, 31, 24, 42, since otherwise G would have a 3-cycle; therefore
G must have two bidirected edges. The bidirected edges cannot be adjacent
else G would have a collapsible vertex, therefore G must be the first graph













Finally suppose G has no 3-cycles or 4-cycles. Then every edge must be
a bidirected edge, and G must be a tree with all bidirected edges. Since G is
not a star, this only leaves the second graph above, which has π (G) ≥ 6.
We can now finish the proof of Theorem 13.
Proof of Theorem 13. If c (G) ≤ 2 then, by Corollary 28, G is a single
vertex, a cycle, chorded cycle or a 2-rose. If c (G) ≥ 3 then the result follows
by Proposition 33.
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5 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, after a couple of preliminary results, we apply Theorem 13
to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 34 If G is a chorded cycle on 4 or more vertices, then τ (G) ≥ 3.
Proof. We can express G as a union of two paths P,Q from 1 to 2, say
and a third path R from 2 to 1. At least one of the first two paths, say P
must have an intermediate vertex, say 3. Since m ≥ 4 there is an additional
intermediate vertex 4 on one of the paths.











For these graphs we have τ24 = 3, τ42 = 3 and τ34 = 3, respectively. Thus
τ (G) ≥ 3 in all three cases.
If m > 4 then G can be realized as one of these graphs, albeit with
additional intermediate vertices on one or more of the paths P,Q,R. These
additional vertices are ordinary uncovered vertices, with collapsible outgoing
edges. Collapsing one of these edges does not increase time complexity, and
produces a smaller chorded cycle G′. Arguing by induction onm we conclude
τ (G) ≥ τ (G′) ≥ 3.
Lemma 35 If G is the complete graph, then πij (G) = m (m− 1) for all
i 6= j.
Proof. Fix a pair of vertices i 6= j in G. Then we claim that the price
ratio pij (G) depends on each of the m (m− 1) edge weights bkl. Indeed if
H is any "spanning" connected subgraph of G then pij (H) is obtained from
pij (G) by specializing to 0 the weights of all edges outside H. Therefore it
suffi ces to find a connected subgraph H such that pij (G) depends on bkl.
We consider two cases. If {i, j} = {k, l} then exchanging i, j if necessary
we may assume i = k, j = l. Let H be an m-cycle two of whose edges are ij
and hi (say); then pi/pj = bhi/bij depends on bkl = bij.
If {i, j} 6= {k, l} then let H be an 2-rose with loops C1 and C2 such that
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1. k is the special vertex, and kl is an edge in C1
2. i belongs to C1 and j belongs to C2
Then pi and pj are each given by unique directed trees Ti and Tj. Moreover
Ti involves kl while Tj does not. Hence pij (H) depends on bkl.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let S denote the set consisting of the three
special mechanisms: star, cycle and complete. We need to show that M =
S, where M denotes the set of -minimal elements of M = M(m).
Let us say that G is a minimal graph if MG is a minimal mechanism of
M. Now the star mechanism has complexity (τ, π) = (2, 4). Therefore if G
is any minimal graph then either τ (G) = 1 or π (G) ≤ 4. For τ (G) = 1
we get the complete graph, which has complexity (τ, π) = (1,m (m− 1)) by
Lemma 35. The graphs with π (G) ≤ 4 are characterized by Theorem 13,
and we have three possibilities for G.
1. Chorded cycle. In this case we have (τ, π) = (3+, 4) by Lemma 34, and
so G is not minimal.
2. Cycle. In this case we have (τ, π) = (m− 1, 2) by Lemma 9.
3. k-rose, k ≥ 2. If each petal of G has exactly 2 edge then G is the star
mechanism. Otherwise after collapsing edges, we obtain the following
minor with τ12 = 3
1
↓ ↖
· → ·  2
Thus G has complexity (τ, π) = (3+, 4) and so is not minimal.
Thus the three graphs in the statement of Theorem 1 are the only pos-
sible minimal graphs, and have the indicated complexities. Since they are
incomparable with each other, each is minimal. Thus we conclude M = S
as desired.
Remark 36 For m = 3, Lemma 34 does not hold and we have an additional





6 Proof of Theorem 8
Note that a mechanism is determined uniquely by its net trade function
ν(a, b) := r(a, b) − a which, although initially defined for a ≤ b, admits a
natural extension as follows.
Proposition 37 The function ν admits a unique extension to S×S+ satis-
fying
ν(λa+ λ′a′, b) = λν(a, b) + λ′ν(a′, b), ν (a, λb) = ν (a, b) for λ, λ′ > 0
Proof. Since ν(a, b) := r(a, b)− a, it suffi ces to show
r(λa+ λ′a′, b) = λr(a, b) + λ′r(a′, b), r (a, λb) = r (a, b) for λ, λ′ > 0 (10)
But this is just Lemma 1 of [8], whose proof we now reproduce for the
sake of completeness.
First observe that, by the conservation of commodities, r(a, b) ≤ b for all
a ≤ b; moreover if a and a′ in S are such that a + a′ ≤ b, then Aggregation
implies the functional (Cauchy) equation r(a+ a′, b) = r(a, b) + r(a′, b).
From Corollary 2 in [1] we conclude that, for all non-negative λ and λ′
such that λa+ λ′a′ ≤ b, the first inequality of (10) holds.
Next let a ≤ b and choose λ ≥ 1. Then the argument just given shows
that r(λa, λb) = λr(a, λb). On the other hand, Invariance implies that the
left side equals λ(a, b). Comparing these expressions we obtain the second
inequality of (10).
Thus even for a not less than b, we may define r(a, b) via (10) by choosing
λ suffi ciently large. This extends r to all of S × S+.
In view of the above result, we drop the restriction a ≤ b when considering
ν (a, b).
The net trade vector can have negative and positive components, and
hence belongs to Rm. The next definition pertains to such vectors in Rm.
Definition 38 By an i-vector, we mean a vector whose ith component is
positive and all other components are zero. By an ı̄j-vector we mean a vector
that has a negative i-component, a positive j-component and zeros in all other
components.
Proposition 39 For b ∈ S+ and any i 6= j there is a ∈ S such that ν(a, b)
is an ı̄j-vector.
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Proof. Since the graph G underlying the mechanism is connected, there
is a directed path from i to j. Denote the nodes on the path by i = 1, . . . , t =
j. Let w1 be an i-vector which can be offered on edge 12 to get a return
w2 6= 0 consisting only of commodity 2 (here w2 6= 0 by Non-dissipation);
then w2 can be offered on edge 23 to get w3 6= 0 consisting only of commodity





= wi+1 for i = 1, . . . , t− 1
If w =
∑
wi then by Proposition 37 we have






= wt − w1
which is an ı̄j-vector.
It will be convenient to write an ı̄j-vector in the form (−x, y) after sup-
pressing the other components. In the context of the above proposition if
ν (a, b) = (−x, y) then by linearity ν (a/x, b) = (−1, y/x), and we will say
that the offer a (or a/x) achieves an ij-exchange ratio of y/x at b.
Proposition 39 shows that there exists at least one offer a to achieve an
ı̄j-vector in trade, at any given b. But a is by no means unique. There may
be many paths from i to j, along which i can be exchanged exclusively for j;
and, also, there may be more complicated trading strategies, that use edges
no longer confined to any single path, to accomplish such an exchange. These
could give rise to offers different from a and yield (for the fixed aggregate
b) other ı̄j-vectors in trade. But, as the following lemma shows, the same
exchange ratio obtains under all circumstances.
Lemma 40 If a′, a′′achieve ij-exchange ratios α′, α′′ at b, then α′ = α′′.
Proof. By Proposition 39 there exists an a such that ν (a, b) is a j̄i-
vector; if α is the corresponding exchange ratio then by rescaling a, a′, a′′ we
may assume that
ν (a, b) = (1,−α) , ν (a′, b) = (−1, α′) , ν (a′′, b) = (−1, α′′) .
By Proposition 37 we get
ν (a+ a′, b) = (0, α− α′)
Now by Non-dissipation we get α ≥ α′, and exchanging the roles of i and j
we conclude that α′ ≥ α and hence that α = α′. Arguing similarly we get
α = α′′ and hence that α′ = α′′
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Lemma 41 Denote the net trade function of M by ν. Then there is a unique
map p : RK++ → Rm++/ ∼ satisfying p(b) · ν(a, b) = 0.
Proof. Fix b ∈ S+ and consider the vector
p = (1, p2, . . . , pm)
where p−1j is the 1j-exchange ratio at b, as in Lemma 40. We will show that
p satisfies the budget balance condition, i.e. that
p · ν (a, b) = 0 for all a. (11)
We argue by induction on the number d (a, b) of non-zero components of
ν (a, b) in positions 2, . . . ,m. If d (a, b) = 0 then ν (a, b) = 0 by Non-
dissipation and (11) is obvious. If d (a, b) = 1 then ν (a, b) is either an
1̄j-vector or a j̄1 vector, which by the definition of pj and Lemma 40 is








for such vectors (11) is immediate. Now suppose d (a, b) = d > 1 and fix j
such that νj (a, b) 6= 0. Then we can choose a′ such that ν (a′, b) is a 1̄j or
a j̄1- vector such that νj (a, b) = −νj (a′, b) . It follows that d (a+ a′, b) < d
and by linearity we get
p · ν (a, b) = p · ν (a+ a′, b)− p · ν (a′, b) .
By the inductive hypothesis the right side is zero, hence so is the left side.
Finally the uniqueness of the price function is obvious, because the return
function of the mechanism dictates how many units of j may be obtained for
one unit of i, yielding just one possible candidate for the exchange rate for
every pair ij.
We can now prove Theorem 8
Proof. (of Theorem 8) To prove thatM = MG it is enough to show that
p and r satisfy (1) and (3).
Let us write, as before,
b =
∑
aα, p = p(b) and ν (a, b) = r(a, b)− a.
Consider replacing trader α by m traders α1, . . . , αm, where trader αj makes
only the offers
{
aαij : 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
in aα that entitle α to the return of com-
modity j. By Aggregation this will have no effect on traders other than α;
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and hence αj will get precisely the return rj(aα, b). By Lemma 41, applied








which is just (3).
Now (1) follows by summing (12) over all α.
7 A Continuum of Traders
Our analysis easily extends to the case where the set of individuals T is the
unit interval [0, 1], endowed with a nonatomic population measure 12. Let S




S+. (An element of S represents a choice of offers by the traders in T which
are positive on aggregate.) In the same vein, let R denote the collection of
all integrable functions from T to C, whose elements r : T 7→ C represent
returns to T. An exchange mechanism M , on a given set of m commodities,
is a map from S to R such that, if M maps a to r then we have (reflecting






Wewrap theAggregation andAnonymity conditions into one, and directly
postulate that the return to any individual depends only on his own offer and
the integral of everyone’s offers, and that this return function is the same for
everyone. Thus we have a function r from S×S+ to C such that r(t) = r(a, b),
where a = a(t) and b =
∫
T
a. The following lemma is essentially from [6].
Proposition 42 r(a, b) is linear in a (for fixed b) and r(a, λb) = r(a, b) for
any a, b and positive scalar λ.
Proof. We will first show that if a, c ∈ S and 0 < λ < 1, then
r(λa+ (1− λ)c, b) = λr(a, b) + (1− λ)r(c, b)







f for any measurable function f on [0, 1] .
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There clearly exists an integrable map d from T = [0, 1] to space of of-
fers S such that (i) positive mass of traders choose a in d; (ii) positive





r(d,b) = b since commodities are conserved. Shift ελ
mass from a to λa+(1−λ)c and (1−λ)ε mass from c to λa+(1−λ)c , letting
the rest be according to d. This yields a new function (from T to S ) which
we call e. Clearly the integral of e on T is also b. Therefore, once again by
conservation of commodities, we must have
∫
T





r(e,b). But this can only be true if the displayed equality holds, proving
that (every coordinate of) r is affi ne in a for fixed b.
Now r(0, b) ≥ 0 by assumption. Suppose r(0, b)  0. Partition T into
two non-null sets T1 and T2. Consider the case where all the individuals in T1
offer 0, and all in T2 offer b/µ(T2). Then, since everone in T1 gets the return
r(0, b)  0, by conservation of commodities everyone in T2 gets b − µ(T1)
r(0, b)   b/µ(T2), contradicting non-dissipation. So r(0, b) = 0, showing r is
linear.
Finally λr(a, b) = r(λa, λb) = λr(a, λb),where the first equality comes
from Invariance and the second from linearity.
Remark 43 As mentioned in the introduction, when there is a continuum
of traders, the star mechanism leads to equivalence (or, near-equivalence) of
Nash and Walras equilibria under suitable postulates regarding the commodity
or fiat money. (See [7] for a detailed discussion.)
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